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COPYRIGHTS AND TV-A NEW USE FOR THE MULTIPLE
PERFORMANCE THEORY
Influential in the financial fate of our most rapidly growing industry' will
be the extent to which telecasters are protected from free commercial use of
their product in public places of entertainment. Today television brings to the
owners of hotels, clubs, and bars the benefits of greater patronage,2 while at
the same time it has brought to movie producers,3 sports promoters, 4 and
others who create the subject matter of telecasts, the woes of smaller gate
receipts. In the future these groups will demand compensation, and the courts
soon will be faced with the question of which of those who benefit from tele-
vision must bear its costs. Should there be a diminution in benefits as the veneer
of novelty wears thin, it will nevertheless be necessary to determine whether
there is sufficient property right in television to permit the exaction of payments
r "There were one million TV sets in use at the beginning of 1949, 3,6ooooo a year later, and
5,8oo,ooo on May i, i95o. The industry estimates that nine million sets will be in use by the
end of the year. It expects to reach a saturation point of about 30 million sets in 1955. In
May ig5o, io3 television broadcasting stations were operating in sixty large marketing areas
with a population of about 70 million; a total of 121 stations was scheduled to be in operation
before the end of the year." TV-Who's Afraid, 42 Fortune, No. i, at 55 (July ig5o). The
Gillette Company paid $8ooooo for TV rights in the 95o World Series-four times what it
paid last year. Up and Up, 36 Newsweek, No. io, at 48 (Sept. 4, ig5o).
2The N.Y. Times, p. 4i, col. 3 (June io, 1948), reports that television profits from taverns
have increased from io% to 60%; 67% of taverns had sets at 
that date.
3 "Surveys among the nation's 5,863,ooo TV set owners show that their movie-going has
fallen off by 20 to 30%." Pandora's Box, 55 Time, No. 22, at 86 (May 29, 195o). Consult
Shared Blame, 36 Newsweek, No. 2r, at 60 (Nov. 2o, r95o).
4 Except for minor league baseball, television has had a beneficial effect on sports attend-
ance according to some authorities. Business Week 74 (May 27, 195o). But the British experi-
ence over a longer period indicates that this is a short-run phenomenon. "Agreed that tele-
vision was slashing their gate receipts, leading British sports promoters met last week in
London and came up with a novel proposal: Copyright all sports events and license viewing
rights to hotels, clubs, pubs, etc." Copyrighted Contests, 35 Newsweek, No. 46, at 87 (April
24, Ig5o). More recent sources indicate that although sports attendance has risen in non-
television areas, it has declined sharply where events are telecast. Truly "video is sabotaging
the box office." Wall Street Journal, p. i, col. 6 (Jan. 31, igsi). See also TV Disrupts Sports
Business, Business Week 49 (Jan. 27, 1951).
5 "The most sensational and controversial analysis of the impact of TV, made by Charles
Alldredge last January, showed that 4oo TV-owning families in the District of Columbia re-
duced their movie attendance from 4.51 to 1.27 times a month after installing TV in their
homes-a reduction of 72 per cent. The survey reported magazine reading off 22.6 per cent,
book reading off 29.1 per cent, and newspapers off 4.7 per cent, baseball 36.6 per cent, wrestling
and boxing 44.7 per cent. Members of these families said they spent on the average more than
40 per cent more of their free time at home during periods when television was on the air."
TV-Who's Afraid, 42 Fortune, No. i, at 55 (July, i95o).
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from those who receive telecasts in public places for commercial purposes.i To
prognosticate the trend of decisions requires careful examination of legally sig-
nificant concepts in related fields and changes which lawyers and judges have
made and may make in their meanings.
Precedent which has grown up about the radio industry provides the closest
analogies to many of the problems in television law;7 and definitions which
radio cases have given to salient terms, especially in the realm of copyright law,
are certain to exert influence in this field. Were it not for the copyright protec-
tion afforded composers, which enabled them to substitute license fees from
radio stations, hotels, theaters, and taverns for reductions in royalties, radio
might well have plugged popular songs to death without paying more for the
privilege than the cost of sheet music or a phonograph record.8 Where the sub-
ject matter of television is copyrightable, as in the case of lectures, dramas,
movies, and music,9 a creator complying with the Copyright Act 0 may sue for
6 It is not, of course, contended here that advertising sponsors cannot or will not stand
the brunt of increased cost; but it should be apparent from the radio cases which follow that
this is not an inevitable occurrence. Insofar as they assume this burden, the question be-
comes one of determining other sources of income for telecasters, performers, authors, and
promoters. As home television sets become more common, the attraction of sets in public
places will certainly diminish; the exigencies of competition, however, will probably require
tavern keepers, hotel owners, and their kind to continue using them. It is doubtful that copy-
right owners will forego the benefits of licensing them any more than they have done in the
case of phonograph records or radio. See note 69 infra.
7 This trend is already apparent in defamation cases where television would seem to present
a more unusual problem than in the field of literary property. In Remington v. Bentley, 88
F. Supp. 166, 169 (S.D.N.Y., 1949), the district judge found that the "additional factor of
pictorial representation" adds nothing to the form of defamation "in spite of the fact that
defamation in motion pictures has been treated as libel." But see Barry, Radio, Television, and
the Law of Defamation, 23 Aust. L.J. 203 (x949).
8 "[A] song which without radio would move more slowly and searchingly over the country,
now reaches its apex of popularity and inevitable decline in a much shorter time." Hynes,
Radio and Royalties, iS Notre Dame Lawyer 29o , 3o6 (194o). In the mid-19 2o's, this same
article points out, 6,5oo,ooo copies of "'Ti ll We Meet Again" were sold, while after 1933 and
the great radio boom the best-selling songs sold well under 3oo,ooo copies. Irving Berlin's
"All Alone" had sold I,125,ooo copies in 1926; but his equally popular pieces, "How Deep Is
the Ocean" and "Say It Isn't So," could not achieve the 3oo,oo mark after 1933. The resort
of harried composers was to copyright law; and decisions that both unauthorized broadcasting
(Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 411 [C.A. 6th,
1925]) and unauthorized commercial reception (Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S.
191 [i933], and Society of European S.A.A.C. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. i
[S.D.N.Y., 1937]) were acts infringing their copyrights made possible the exacting of fees from
this new group of commercial users which more than adequately compensated them for losses
in other areas. Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters, and the Sherman Act, 29 Geo. L.J. 407
(1941), contains the history and statistics.
9 Works which are to be used solely in television broadcasts may be registered under the
simple requirements of Section 12 which pertains to unpublished works, 6i Stat. 652 (1947),
as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. § 12 (Supp., 1949), since telecasting will probably not constitute a
publication within the meaning of the Act or the law of literary property. Cases cited notes
20-22 infra.
Section 12 provides the same protection for unpublished works as is afforded those pub-
lished. Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 131 F. 2d 929 (C.A. 2d, 1942). Regulations of the
Copyright Office permit registration of dramatic scripts and motion pictures designed for tele-
vision transmission. 37 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 202.5, 202.13, 202.14 (1949).
to 61 Stat. 652 (1947), as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. (Supp., 1949).
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an unlicensed reproduction or public performance of his work;, or may assign
his rights to the telecaster." Commentators agree, however, that television
broadcasts are themselves too ephemeral to come within the scope of the
Act.3
Where the protection of the Copyright Act is not available, or where the
creator has failed to take advantage of it, he may turn to common-law property
rights.4 If his work falls within the broad category of literary property's and
no publication or dedication to the public is established, 6 he too will be pro-
tected from infringing acts. Although some broadcast material, such as news
and sports events, may not in itself be subject to common-law property rights, 7
it has been well argued that telecasts which entail much effort, artistic
,Z In the case of musical compositions the performance must be for profit as well as public.
Copyright Act, 61 Stat. 652 (1947), as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. § x(e) (Supp., 1949).
12 61 Stat. 652 (1947)
, 
as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. § 28 (Supp., i949). However, recent de-
cisions may have qualified the rights of an owner of a large number of copyrights. Cases cited
note 63 infra.
'3 The major obstacles appear to be difficulties in registration, 61 Stat. 652 (947), as amend-
ed, i7 U.S.C.A. § 11, §§ 209-2x3 (Supp., 1949), and the improbability of bringing telecasts
within even the court's liberal interpretation of "all the writings of an author" which phrase
determines the coverage of the Copyright Act, 6r Stat. 652 (1947), as amended, 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 4 (Supp., 1949).
14 Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Television Programs by Common Law
Copyright, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 2o9 (i95o); Cooper, The Limited Application of Property Con-
cepts in the Law of Television, io Fed. Comm. B.J. 132 (1949); The Property Right in a
Sports Telecast, 35 Va. L. Rev. 246 (1949); and Solinger, Unauthorized Use of Television
Broadcasts, 48 Col. L. Rev. 848 (1949).
The availability of other theories, such as unfair competition and equitable servitudes,
which are outside the scope of this paper, is also dependent upon an ability to prove an in-
vasion of common-law property rights. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86, 88,
89 (C.A. 2d, i94o).
's "[A]n individual has a property right in his original, unpublished, intellectual produc-
tions." Ketcham v. New York World's Fair, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657, 658 (E.D.N.Y., 1940),
aff'd x19 F. 2d 422 (C.A. 2d, 1941). For an almost exhaustive list of the works in which a com-
mon-law copyright has been found, including everything from a musical laugh to a ticker-
tape quotation, see Warner, op. cit. supra note 14, at 211-13.
6 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., X92 P. 2d 495 (Cal. App., 1948), aff'd
208 P. 2d 9 (Cal., 1949); Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (U.S.) 591 (1834).
17 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Associated Press v.
XVOS, Inc., 8o F. 2d 575 (C.A. 9th, 1935), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
In view of the finding of a quasi-property right as against a competitor in these cases, there is
reason to question whether the commentators are correct in saying that news is entirely in
the public domain.
As for sports events, there is a dispute as to whether or not there may be a property right
in the exclusive privilege to broadcast a play-by-play description. National Exhibition Co. v.
Tele-Flash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y., 1936) stands for the proposition that there is
none, while in both Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press Service, Inc., i65
N.Y. Misc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (S. Ct., 1937), and Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad-
casting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa., 1938), the courts found a protectable property right in
such a privilege. Cf. Rudolph Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Path6 News, Inc., 235 App. Div. 774,
255 N.Y. Supp. iox6 (ist Dep't, 1932), without opinion, and comment thereon in Solinger,
Unauthorized Use of Television Broadcasts, 48 Col. L. Rev. 848, 858 (948).
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skill, and equipment, are "original unpublished, intellectual productions"' 8
deserving of common-law copyright protection.19 Surprisingly enough, the
requirement of nonpublication can be fulfilled without great difficulty, for it
has been fairly well established that neither a radio broadcast 2° nor the exhibi-
tion of a movie, constitutes a dedication sufficient to deprive an author of his
common-law copyright. 2 Certainly television can be analogized to one of
these.3
It is, then, quite possible that every obstacle to obtaining protection under
either common-law or statutory copyright can be hurdled. All that remains is
proof that the defendant has infringed the copyright by public performance,
rendition, or reproduction of plaintiff's literary property.2 4 Yet, paradoxically
'$Ketchum v. New York World's Fair, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.N.Y., 194o), aff'd
ri9 F. 2d 422 (C.A. 2d, 1941).
'9 "Any television program, including a news, sports, or dramatic show.., requires the
use of technical and artistic skill-viz., lighting effects, camera angles, integration and syn-
thesis of sight and sound to produce a finished television production." Warner, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 216. Despite vigorous arguments in this article and in The Property Right in a
Sports Telecast, 35 Va. L. Rev. 246, 256 (1949), there is good reason to believe that the law
is contrary. The evanescence of a telecast would seem to distinguish it from photographs, cf.
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491 (1939), and photoplays,
Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C.A. 2d, 1914), to which they have
been analogized. In a similar situation Judge Learned Hand in R.C.A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86, 88 (C.A. 2d, i94o), had serious doubts as to whether a record manu-
facturer has any literary property in his skillfully produced records. Nevertheless, the in-
junctions restraining exhibition of the Louis-Walcott fight telecast must have been based upon
some kind of property right in the event or telecast, cases cited note 74 infra. Besides, wise
telecasters may simply incorporate copyrighted material into their uncopyrightable pro-
ductions (e.g., musical compositions with sports events) in such a way as to protect them from
piracy.
20 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 192 P. 2d 495 (Cal. App., 1948), aff'd
208 P. 2d o (Cal., x949); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C., 1939); Uproar Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 858 (Mass., 1934), modified without discussion on this
point, 81 F. 2d 373 (C.A. ist, i936), cert. denied 298 U.S. 670 (1936). But see Blanc v. Lantz,
83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1949).
"Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93 F. 2d 489 (C.A. 2d, 1937); M-G-M Distribut-
ing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F. 2d 7o (C.A. 1st, 1932); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v.
Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C.A. 2d, 1914). But see Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal.
Super. Ct., 1947).
" Among analogous acts which have been held not to constitute publication are the pro-
duction of a play, Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); the delivery of a lecture, Nutt v.
National Institute, Inc., for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F. 2d 236 (C.A. 2d, 1929); the
playing of a musical composition, McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 Fed. 364
(S.D.N.Y., i919); exhibition of a painting, American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207
U.S. 284 (i9o7).
2" Such has been the approach in major articles on the subject. Authorities cited note 14
supra.
24 "Copyright in any form, whether statutory or at common law, is a monopoly; it consists
only in the power to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted work. W.B.O. Broad-
casting Corporation has never invaded any such right of Whiteman; they have never copied
his performance at all; they have merely used the copies which he and R.C.A. Manufacturing
Company, Inc., made and distributed." R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, I14 F. 2d 86, 88 (C.A.
2d, 194o). Judge Hand's particular application of this principle may be considered incorrect,
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enough, this obvious requirement may prove an insuperable barrier. Clearly,
one who invites his friends into his home for an evening of "televiewing" has
violated no right of the telecaster or copyright owner. 5 At first blush, the act of
a tavern keeper or hotel owner who permits his patrons to view his receiving set
appears equally innocuous. However, whether or not such an act constitutes a
copyright infringement depends largely upon the courts' interpretation of the
concept "performance.2 6 To predict their conclusion it is necessary to analyze
carefully the application of that concept in the field of radio law where prac-
tically identical issues have already been resolved.
Historically, extension of the complex concept "public performance for
profit ' ' 27 to commercial radio broadcasting followed a logically reverse order;
and only after determinations that broadcasts were "for profit"; 8 and "public,
'
1
2 9
did an examination of the "performance" issue occur. In earlier cases problems
of performance were not involved, the infringing radio stations having them-
selves been responsible for playing the musical compositions. Whether a broad-
cast alone could constitute a performance was raised sharply, however, in
Waring v. WDAS Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ati. 631 (i937); but the principle itself seems
inherent in the concept "copyright." It is for this reason that courts have been forced to fit
radio reception into an acceptable definition of performance. Nor is it difficult to sympathize
with their confusion in attempting to give the act of turning a receiving set knob the indicia
of reproduction.
25 "[Tlhose who listen do not perform, and therefore do not infringe." Jerome H. Remick
& Co. v. General Electric Co., i6 F. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y., 1926). "He who only hears the perform-
ance is not performing." Buck v. Duncan, 32 F. 2d 366, 367 (W.D. Mo., 1929). "The parties
agree that the owner of a private radio receiving set who in his own home invites friends to
hear a musical composition which is being broadcast, would not be liable for infringement.
For even if this be deemed a performance, it is neither public nor for profit." Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. II, x96 (r931). "[T]he reception of a broadcast program by one
who listens to it is not any part of the performance thereof." Society of European S.A.A.C.
v. New York Hotel Statler Co., ig F. Supp. i, 4 (S.D.N.Y., 1937).
2
6 Insofar as statutory copyrights are concerned, the salient portions of the Copyright Act,
61 Stat. 652 (1947), as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. § I (Supp., 1949), read as follows: ". Any per-
son entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this titie, shall have the exclusive
right:... (d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama... (e)
To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition."
27 Ibid.
28 Shortly after the first commercial radio station (KDKA, erected in Pittsburgh in 1920)
had come into existence, the unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted song was held to be "for
profit." Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (N.J., 1923). Being a contest
solely of this narrow issue, the case was easily decided upon the authority of Herbert v. The
Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (i917), in which Justice Holmes, overruling John Church Co. v. H-Tillard
Hotel Co., 221 Fed. 229 (C.C.N.Y., 1915), found it unnecessary that a direct charge be made
for atmosphere music in a hotel dining room to make its performance "for profit," the in-
direct advantage to the hotel owner in terms of increased patronage being sufficient.
29 In Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 411, 412
(C.A. 6th, 1925), the court, conceding that radio listeners do not congregate in one place,
nevertheless concluded that radio broadcasting was "public" since it was intended to reach
"a very much larger number of the public at the moment of rendition than any other medium
of performance."
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Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co.30 where the broadcaster had
"picked up" an orchestra's unauthorized rendition. An injunction pendente lite
had been denied on the ground that defendant broadcaster was simply making
"a given performance available to a greater number of persons, who, but for his
efforts, would not hear it."31 Nevertheless, on final hearing the court concluded
that defendant broadcaster's part in the performance was something more than
the mere opening of a window (to which it had been analogized) and that he
was liable as a "contributory infringer."32 Clearly it was not decided that the
broadcast was itself a performance, but simply that the role of the broadcaster
in the infringement of the copyright was sufficiently important to make him
equally liable with the performing artists.33
Appearing in a context more closely analogous to the subject at hand, the
question as to what constitutes a performance again became significant in
Buck v. Debaum34 where the copyright owner claimed infringement by a cafe
proprietor who had tuned in the licensed broadcast of a copyrighted song for
the entertainment of his patrons. Assuming in light of prior decisions that such
a use was public and for profit, the court nevertheless held that by authorizing
the broadcast the plaintiff had "impliedly sanctioned" all radio reception.35
In finding that "the operation of the radio receiving set in effect does nothing
more than one would do who opened a window and permitted the strain of
music of a passing band to come within"36 the court appeared to negate the idea
that radio reception could be performance in itself. Strengthening this interpre-
tation is the court's approval of Buck v. Duncan,37 a contemporaneous decision
in which radio reception was expressly held not to be a performance within
the terms of the Copyright Act.38
30 i6 F. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y., 1926).
3t Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 4 F. 2d 16o, 16o (S.D.N.Y., 1924).
3' "It is not enough to say that the broadcaster merely opens the window and the orchestra
does the rest. On the contrary, the acts of the broadcaster are found in the reaction of his in-
struments constantly animated and controlled by himself, and those acts are quite as con-
tinuous and infinitely more complex than the playing of the selection by the members of the
orchestra." Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F. 2d 829, 829 (S.D.N.Y.,
1926).
33 It is equally clear that the court, in using the phrase "contributory infringer," did not
imply that the broadcaster would not have been liable if the orchestra had not itself been in-
fringing. The opinion explicitly states that even if there had been no audience in the ballroom,
the broadcaster's acts would have been a violation of plaintiff's copyright.
34 40 F. 2d 734 (S.D. Cal., X929).
35 "[WMhen plaintiffs licensed the broadcasting station to disseminate the 'Indian Love
Call,' they impliedly sanctioned and consented to any 'pick up' out of the air that was possible
in radio reception." Ibid., at 735.
36 Ibid., at 735.
37.32 F. 2d 366 (W.D. Mo., 1929).
38 "The right to perform a musical composition does not carry with it a proprietary interest
in the waves that go out upon the air or upon the ether. They are as much the common property
of all as the sunshine and the zephyrs." Ibid., at 367.
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The Duncan case involved reception of unauthorized broadcasts of ASCAP's
copyrighted songs by a master-receiving set wired to loudspeakers in the pri-
vate and public rooms of a hotel. It was subsequently reversed on appeal
sub nom. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.39 where, in answering the contention
of defense counsel that a single broadcast could be but a single performance under
the copyright statute, Justice Brandeis wrote: "[N]othing in the Act circum-
scribes the meaning to be attributed to the term 'performance,' or prevents a
single rendition of a copyrighted selection from resulting in more than one pub-
lic performance for profit."4o By thus subscribing to the doctrine of "multiple
performance," the Supreme Court succeeded in breaking a single broadcast into
three separate and potentially infringing performances; that of the performing
artist to the studio audience, that of the broadcaster to the radio audience, and
that of one who tunes in the broadcast. Under the "multiple performance"
analysis, where chain broadcasting is involved, infringing performances have
been held to be as numerous as the stations which participate.4' A network
broadcast received in enough public places could result in literally thousands
of performances, each a basis for recovery.
Despite the breadth of protection afforded by the LaSalle opinion, one escape
had been left open. In a footnote dictum Justice Brandeis hesitatingly sanc-
tioned the position of Buck v. Debaum by stating that if the broadcast had been
authorized, a license for commercial reception might have been implied.42 This
gap has been closed, however, by the opinion in Society of European S.A.A.C.
v. New York Hotel Statler,43 where, in a fact-situation almost identical with that
of the LaSalle case except that the broadcast was licensed, the reception was
held to constitute an infringement. Much weight might be placed upon the
fact that the copyright owners, following Brandeis' hint, had expressly re-
stricted the broadcaster's license so as to prohibit commercial reception;44 but
the district judge treated this clause as mere redundancy.45
With the closing of this gap, however, another was revealed which portends
to be of even greater value to those commercial users who employ home-size
39283 U.S. i91 (1931).
40 Ibid., at 198.
41 "Plaintiff's composition was performed on three occasions by the National Broadcasting
Company with chain hook-ups of 67, 66, and 85 stations, in all 218. Damages should be awarded
on the theory that there were 218 performances, not three." Law v. National Broadcasting
Co., 5I F. Supp. 798, 799 (S.D.N.Y., 1943).
42 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty, 283 U.S. 191, i99 n. 5 (x931).
439i F. Supp. i (S.D.N.Y., 1937).
44" 'Nothing herein contained shall be construed as permitting the licensee either expressly
or by implication to grant to others the right to reproduce or perform publicly for profit or
otherwise... any of said compositions ... or in any way permitting any receiver of the
broadcast of any of said compositions or works to publicly perform or reproduce the same
for profit or otherwise.' " Ibid., at 3.
45 "It seems to me that the effect of the addition of this limitation to the license was merely
to add emphasis to the fact that the license was given to N.B.C. solely for its own use, and
hence that the limitation was a redundancy." Ibid., at 6.
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television or radio receivers unaided by other reproducing devices. In the
Hotel Statler case it was stated:
[Tihe reception of a broadcast program by one who listens to it is not any part of the
performance thereof. Indeed both physically and mentally it is about as far removed
from performance as can well be imagined.... I find that when the owner of a hotel does
as much as is done in the Hotel Pennsylvania to promote the reproduction within its walls
of a broadcast program received by it, it must be considered as giving a performance within
the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the LaSalle Hotel case... copyright
infringennt depends, not on the broadcaster's rights, but on the receiver's acts.46
Here, then, the existence of a performance is to be determined by the effort
employed in reaping commercial advantage from another's work and by the
extent to which those efforts have expanded the audience witnessing that 4iork,47
not by a set of purely verbal definitions making reception a performance per se.
Under the LaSalle doctrine one who invites friends into his home to listen to
his receiving set is shielded from liability because his "performance" is neither
"public" nor "for profit," while in the Hotel Statler casehe is not an infringer be-
cause he is not performing at all; he is merely listening to his radio.48 This lat-
ter criterion depends upon a concrete determination as to where on the con-
tinuum between the extremes of passive listening and active performance the
questioned acts of the defendant are located. Specifically, it represents a step
on the road to repudiation of the "multiple performance" doctrine and return
to the theory of Remick v. General Electric Co.49 under which liability is de-
pendent upon the degree to which the efforts of one receiving a broadcast have
contributed to an invasion of another's copyright.
Illustrating the significance of this difference in definition, British and Cana-
dian cases provide excellent examples of the consequences of extending the
general language in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. Although slower to deter-
mine that either radio broadcastings° or radio receptions' was a public per-
formance, the English judiciary arrived, three years earlier, at a result similar
to that of Society of European S.A.A.C. v. New York Hotel Statler.s In Perform-
ing Right Society v. Hammond's Bradford Brewery,5 3 commercial reception of an
46 Ibid., at 4 (italics added).
47 By taking into account the effort required and the expansion achieved, this criterion
permits those uses of broadcast material which are relatively innocuous and, in a sense, within
the risk a copyright owner takes by authorizing the original broadcast.
48 Cases cited note 25 supra. 49 See text at note 3x supra.
so Messager v. British Broadcasting Company, Ltd., [19271 2 K.B. 543, preceded by an
Australian case, Chappell & Co. v. Associated Radio Co. of Australia, [1925] Vict. L.R. 350,
which cited with approval Remick v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 41x (C.A.
6th, 1925).
s, Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Hammond's Bradford Brewery Co., ['9341 1 Ch. 121.
The British Copyright Act, I & 2 Geo. V, c. 46 (xgx), is very similar to the American except-
ing the absence of a requirement that infringing performances of a musical composition be for
profit. Cf. Ernest Turner Electrical Instruments v. Performing Right Society, ['9431 Ch. Div.
167.
P2 See text at note 43 supra.
53 [1934]11 Ch, 121.
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authorized broadcast of copyrighted music was held to be an infringement.
The George Hotel had attached loudspeakers to its receiving set for its guests
who heard B.B.C.'s broadcast of plaintiff's copyrighted compositions. In the
opinion of Lord Hanworth, M.R., the hotel's liability for infringement resulted
entirely from the fact that without this attachment the broadcast could not
have been heard beyond the limited circle of those who could gather about the
receiving set.54 Employing analogy reminiscent of the opinion in Remick v.
General Electric Co., he wrote:
It is not as if the guests at the hotel merely looked in at the window at a peepshow
which was there for all and sundry to see, but it was by the authority and at the in-
stance of the proprietor of the hotel that steps were taken to render the sounds audible
to the additional audience.z
Unfortunately the less restricted language of the other Lord Justices spelled
out an adherence to the "multiple performance" theory of Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co.56 Illustrative of the absurd results of such a doctrine is Per-
forming Right Society v. Camelo5 7 where defendant was held liable for an in-
fringing "performance" which occurred when copyrighted music from the
receiving set in his private living room was heard by the patrons of an adjoining
restaurant.
Canada's copyright law might well have experienced a similar fate, a Quebec
court having echoed justice Brandeis' conclusion that the reception of radio
waves constitutes a new performance of the broadcast material.s8 Before the
Camelo type of situation presented itself, however, a wise Canadian legislature
had amended its copyright statute to read:
In respect of public performances by means of any radio receiving set or gramophone
in any place other than a theatre which is ordinarily and regularly used for entertain-
ments to which an admission charge is made, no fees, charges, or royalties shall be col-
lectible from the owner or user of the radio receiving set or gramophone but the Copy-
right Appeal Board shall... provide for the collection in advance from radio broad-
casting stations or gramophone manufacturers... of fees.., appropriate to the new
conditions produced by the provisions of this subsection s9
54 "By means of an installation there which included a loudspeaker the radio waves re-
ceived at the George Hotel were converted into sound, audible not merely to the domestic
circle of the George Hotel but to all its visitors. Without such an installation the general com-
pany of the hotel would not have had the opportunity of hearing what had been broadcast."
Ibid., at 132.
s Ibid., at 134.
56 See text at note 39 supra.
57 [1936] 3 All E.R. 557 (Ch.). See Performing Right Society v. George (April 3o, 1936,
unreported), cited in the Camelo case, in which another English judge reached an identical
conclusion on the basis of the decision in Performing Right Society v. Hammond's Bradford
Brewery Co., [i934] 1 Ch. 121.
58 Canadian Performing Right Society v. Ford Hotel, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 391 (Quebec Super.
Ct.).
59 The Copyright Amendment Act, 1938, 2 Geo. VI, c. 27, § 4 (Canada, 1938). The vague
attempt at definition of "theatre" is perhaps deserving of criticism.
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An even wiser Privy Council concluded in the case of Vigneux v. Canadian
Performing Right Society 6o that "the statutory license (or in other words the
right to perform) which the subsection confers is in no way conditional upon
payment of the charges.., by broadcasting stations or gramophone manu-
facturers."
Still uncertain is the outcome of "multiple performance" theory in the fed-
eral courts. But even if it were fully sustained, there is serious question whether
many copyright owners could avail themselves of its benefits. The difficulties
inherent in the detection of copyright violations have made it impossible for
unorganized individual owners effectively to enforce their rights. In the past,
resort has been had to organized combinations capable of providing the neces-
sary policing mechanism. Recent decisions, however, have greatly attenuated
the powers of such groups. Relying in great part upon their legal position as a
result of the LaSalle and Hotel Statler decisions, ASCAP 6' had, during the ten-
year period succeeding the Hotel Statler case, been able to collect from three to
seven million dollars annually in license fees from over twenty-nine thousand
establishments, including radio stations, hotels, bars, restaurants, theaters,
and dance halls.6 So strong had this monopoly power become that the courts
which had given with one hand were compelled to take away with the other.
In 1948 two district judges held ASCAP's licensing system to be violative of
the anti-trust laws63 and may have so thoroughly emasculated its ability to
enforce copyrights6 4 that composers, authors, and publishers eventually will
be no better off than they were in the chaotic years before its founding in 1914.6s
6o ['94511 All E.R. 432,438 (A.C.). The result ensued that a juke box operator was not liable
for what would have constituted an infringing performance before enactment of the statute,
although the record manufacturer had no license from the copyright owner.
61 ASCAP is essentially an association of composers and publishers banded together for the
more efficient protection of their copyrights in musical compositions. Its central functions are
policing infringers and licensing users of copyrighted popular music.
62Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 8o F. Supp. 889, decree modified, So F. Supp. 9oo
(S.D.N.Y., 1948). Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters, and the Sherman Act, 29 Geo. L.J. 407
(194i), exhaustively explores the financial as well as the legal history of ASCAP.
63 Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, So F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y., 1948), and Witmark & Sons
v. Jensen, So F. Supp. 843 (S.D. Minn., 1948).
64Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, So F. Supp. 843, 846 (S.D. Minn., 1948), denies equitable
relief for infringement of his copyright to a member of ASCAP on the ground that "not-
withstanding their seeming beneficent purposes, plaintiffs and their associates through
Ascap [sic] have obtained by these methods and practices ... monopolistic control over copy-
righted films in which their music is integrated." Although ASCAP's policy of "blanket
licensing" was the major violation of the anti-trust laws found by these courts, both judges
admitted that licensing on a "per piece" basis is wholly unfeasible and could be ruinous to
movie exhibitors. Copyright Pooling and the Anti-trust Laws, i7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 183
(1949) and Music Copyright Associations and the Anti-Trust Laws, 25 Ind. L.J. 168 (ig5o),
present extensive studies of the monopoly problems involved.
6s Of course, the central investigatory organization may continue to report infringements;
but without power to enforce blanket licensing this remnant will hardly be useful (ASCAP
makes very little from infringement suits), and it is quite likely that the courts will extend the
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Despite uncertainty as to the position of copyright combines, 66 however, at
least one group of copyright holders is capable of maintaining an efficient
enforcement scheme without fear of anti-trust prosecution.67 There can be no
doubt that this group, individual telecasters, 8 would benefit by application of
multiple performance theory to the field of television.
Evaluation of the interests contingent upon such an application may be
greatly simplified by reflecting on the economic position in which extension of
multiple performance theory would place copyright owners. It appears certain
that program sponsors will foot at least part of the bill for audience losses which
television produces in other fields;69 and hence if allowed to exact license fees
from other commercial users of telecasts, creators will be exacting what may in
fact amount to a second payment. When the problem is viewed in this perspec-
tive, there seems little justification for extending monopoly power based upon
such a distortion of terms as the multiple performance theory represents.
Alden-Rochelle reasoning to licensing practices outside the motion picture industry, pro-hibitions similar to those applied to ASCAP in the Witmark case having been placed upon
Dramatists' Guild of the Authors' League of America. Ring v. Spina, 84 F. Supp. 403
(S.D.N.Y., 1949).
66 Perhaps the consent decree of i95o under which ASCAP is required, inter alia, to "blanket
license" television and movie producers will immunize the Society's activities from attack
as violative of the Sherman Act. N.Y. Times, p. 34, col. 5 (Mar. i5, i95o); cf. Remick MusicCorp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 (Neb., i944). However, the 194I consent de-
cree requiring AS CAP to permit its members to offer their works on a "per piece" basis asindividual bargaining units did not have this effect in the Alden-Rochelle and Witmark cases;
and far from following the reasoning of Alden-Rochelle, the i95o decree appears to sanctionpractices there repudiated (although it contains language similar to the final decree in that
case). Such action on the part of the Justice Department may be realistic and commendablebut will probably not protect ASCAP or other "copyright pools" from private anti-trust
suits. 38 Stat. 731 (r94), as amended, i5 U.S.C.A. § i5 (i94i). It would seem more desirable
to obtain legislative sanction for the recognition of monopoly power.
67 Section i of the Sherman Act being inapplicable because the corporate or individual tele-
caster need not indulge in conspiracy, mere enforcement of a monopoly granted by the legis-lature does not constitute a violation of Section 2.26 Stat. 209 (i8go),as amended, i5 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1, 2 (i95i); see Buck v. Newsreel, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 787 (Mass., 1938) and cases there
cited.
6 See note i9 supra.
69 Judging from the fabulous sums that sponsors have been willing to pay for television time
and rights, neither telecasters nor sports promoters will have much need for testing theirproperty rights which in many cases are still unsettled and uncertain. See note 19 supra.
"[Tihe Gillette Safety Razor Company ... signed up to pay $7,370,0oo over the next six
seasons for All-Star world series radio and television rights." Vaughan, Baseball Deal withVideo Pension Saver, Chicago Daily Tribune, pt. 3, P. 1, col. 7 (Dec. 28, i95o). Although tele-
casting reduced gate receipts from the recent Louis-Charles fight by $iooooo below the lowest
of Louis' previous championship fights, the difference was more than made up by the $i4oooo
which Pabst Blue Ribbon paid for television rights. TV Ruins the Gate But Boosts the Take,Business Week 85 (Oct. 7, i95o). Perhaps the fact that sports events have been the greatest
attractions on television's bill of fare thus far accounts for the relative lack of litigation. It isdifficult to believe, however, that statutory copyright owners, thinking their rights well-
established by Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., will resist the temptation to employ a
lucrative licensing system.
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Rather, efforts should be directed toward correcting the distortion insofar as
possible.
If Congress should succumb to the ever-present pressures for copyright re-
vision reflected in recent decisions adverse to ASCAP, an excellent prototype
for legislative action is the Canadian statute.70 Not only does it modify the
consequences of multiple performance theory by shifting the entire burden of
copyright licenses to broadcasters and record manufacturers, but, at the same
time, it gives legal sanction to copyright pools, without which many creators
would be wholly unable to enforce their rights. Private parties dissatisfied with
a copyright society's published fee schedules may apply to the Copyright Ap-
peal Board which, in determining the reasonableness of fees, is authorized to
consider losses imposed upon owners by statute. Through a simpler licensing
and collecting system under governmental supervision, copyright monopoly
is prevented from becoming an instrument "of oppression and extortion."''
It is highly improbable that such legislation will be forthcoming. Despite per-
sistent pressure Congress has not altered substantive copyright law for almost
half a century; 72 and the change proposed represents so radical a departure
from traditional copyright law that legislative inertia would be even more
difficult to overcome.
It is the judiciary, then, which must determine when television reception
constitutes copyright infringement. Having been committed by Jewell-LaSalle
Realty to certain aspects of multiple performance doctrine, the courts cannot
reject it wholly. At their disposal, however, are the interpretive tools with
whose help it may be supplanted by a factual criterion determining whether
reception constitutes infringement by the degree to which defendant's efforts
have expanded the audience viewing a telecast. Under this criterion the de-
cisions in Buck v. Debaum and Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle. Realty Co. are in no way
incompatible. On the continuum between opening a window and broadcasting
to the world, reception solely by a home-size receiver lies within the realm of
7' 2 Geo. VI, c. 27 (Canada, 1938) further provides in Section x that Section xo(i) of the
Copyright Act, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 8 (Canada, 193i), be amended to read: "[Elach
society, association, or company which carries on in Canada the business of acquiring copy-
rights of dramatico-musical or musical works,... in current use in respect of which such
society ... has authority to issue or grant performing licenses or to collect fees, charges or
royalties for or in respect of the performance of its works in Canada." In Sections ioA and
ioB the amended statute provides for a Copyright Appeal Board empowered to hold hearings
for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of rates set by the copyright socieites and
to alter the rate schedules in conformity with its findings. Copyright Amendment Act, i936,
x Edw. VIII, c. 28, § 2 (Canada, 1936). Of course, the coverage of the statute must be greatly
expanded to encompass both common-law and statutory performing rights in practically all
subject matters; it is the general framework of the Canadian act which is deserving of imi-
tation.
71 Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, 11894] 3 Ch. iog, 128.
22 Responsibility for the recent judicial reaction against the power of copyright combines
might well be laid at the feet of the legislators who failed to act when the time was ripe and
the power not yet oppressive. The Performing Rights in a Musical Composition, 27 Va. L. Rev.
378, 384 (1941), analyzes the legislative attempts as of that date.
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non-infringing acts, while reception over huge master receiving sets connected
to hundreds of loudspeakers stands nearer the opposite pole in the realm of
the infringing73
Already, in Louis v. Richinan,74 a Pennsylvania court seems to have adopted
this criterion by refusing to enjoin the showing of a sports telecast in com-
mercial establishments employing screens no larger than eighteen by twenty-
four inches and making no direct admission charge. Certainly, the judge's
willingness to prohibit the use of television in a large hotel, although not in a
bar and grill (a "poor man's club," as he called it) represents a justifiable
restriction of the copyright owner's already over-extended power. It is sub-
mitted that, if courts follow the lead of Louis v. Richman7s and the Hotel Statler
cases in abandoning the absolutistic principle of multiple performance before
they are irrevocably committed, the burden of copyright monopolies will not
fall so heavily upon the society which grants them.
RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW ENFORCEMENT
The history of racial violence in the United States, filled with accounts of
costly race riots and lynchings, is uncomfortably familiar., Increasingly urgent
is the question whether a great body of civil rights law must remain unenforced
because of the specter of such violence.2
7' Society of European S.A.A.C. v. New York Hotel Statler, 19 F. Supp. i, 2-3 (S.D.N.Y.,
1937), contains a most impressive description of the trouble and expense to which the Hotel
Pennsylvania went in "piping" broadcasts to its 9o0 guest rooms.
74 Equity No. i8o3, Pa. C.P. (Philadelphia, June 23, 1948). See Louis v. Friedman, Equity
No. 18o4, Pa. C.P. (Philadelphia, June 23, 1948) (injunction against exhibitioi of same tele-
cast in a motion picture theater); Louis v. California Products, N.Y. S. Ct. (June 24,
1948) (same, against a ballroom operator); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Mass.
Charitable Mechanics Association, Equity No. 60230, Mass. Super. Ct. (June 22, 1948)
(same); and National Broadcasting Co. pamphlet entitled: "Proceedings in Philadelphia
Actions in C.P. No. i, June Term, 1948, to enjoin commercial uses of the Louis-Walcott
Fight."
7s Equity No. 18o3, Pa. C.P. (Philadelphia, June 23, 1948), unreported.
I Consult Myrdal, An American Dilemma 55o-569 (i944); Chicago Commission on Race
Relations, The Negro in Chicago (1922); Lee and Humphrey, Race Riot (1943); Raper, The
Tragedy of Lynching (1933).
Racial violence is usually treated as an unmitigated evil. However, some observers feel
that it may have positive value as a catalyst for progress in race relations. Myrdal, Social
Trends in America and Strategic Approaches to the Negro Problem, 9 Phylon 196, 208 (1948).
It may also provide an opportunity for minority group resistance to aggression, thus encourag-
ing minority group members to establish positive identification with their group through
collective action. Fisher, The Problem of Violence, Observations on Race Conflict in Los
Angeles i7, i8 (American Council on Race Relations, i947); Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segre-
gation 313-15 (1943). Compare Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew 59-141 (1948) and Broyard,
Portrait of the Inauthentic Negro, io Commentary, No. i, at 56 (July, i95o).
2Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro 26 ff. (194o) contains a summary of the civil
rights legislation passed in many northern states after post-Civil-War federal civil rights legis-
lation was held unconstitutional. Much of the state legislation has ample enforcement pro-
visions. An Illinois statute, e.g., provides that all persons are entitled to full and equal enjoy-
ment of establishments maintained for public use (hotels, restaurants, department stores,
